What weaknesses the proposals here have.
A Government divided from the People, a pretense democracy that is not accountable and not transparent. What this will do is retain the effects as if private Capitalism is still there, just under a different name and some different ways of taking out the profit. A Government with full power of investment finance, as the Constitution proposal demands, can use this finance exactly the way private Capitalism does, and it can extract profit by pumping fresh new money to secret accounts or in cash. There are ways to guard against this: A. Keep watch over the wealth of Government employees and politicians, also when they've left. When there is corruption, the corrupt will be rich without good cause, or they will disappear or pretend to have won the lottery, etc. The system of the maximum on wealth provides a barrier to some of this, but there could be many ways wealth can be hidden in other countries or outside of view. Especially if one is part of the Government that protects the wealth barrier. B. Elect trustworthy people. Perhaps nothing is more effective against corruption then elect people who have an interest in a fair and transparent Government, and to treat these people fairly. C. Keep watch over the value of money as in deflation and inflation, look into whether the accounting of Government is correct, and whether the value of money and Government behavior match. Demanding constant openness from Government about its finances, the total and the fractions. This is a first barrier against the stealing of money. The stealing of money is probably the biggest problem, just after the rigging of elections. D. Maintain Sovereign countries at a certain maximum size. Having many similar countries, with their own coin, means the behavior of Governments can be compared. The diversity gives breathing room to unusual experiments, corrupting Government in a continent (the world) requires corrupting many Governments and not just one, smaller country size heightens democratic influence of each individual reducing the crushing force of society on the least powerful. When significant amount of people know a significant percentage of people in a country it will be difficult to maintain an objective Justice, as it will be hard to be objective on people you already know. Reasonable size for objective countries would therefore probably be between 1 million and 100 million people. Enough not to know most people, and few enough to maintain democracy and diversity. In the long term countries could become smaller for more democratic freedom. Having more countries can result in higher international objectivity, and more effective international Justice, since a larger group can be more objective to each member, and not having extremely powerful (large) members makes power more equal and therefore the will of the majority easier to bring to effect.
A variation on the above problem that can happen before the constitution proposal is ratified, is a pretense-change. The investment-funds and banks are forced to accept direction from Government, framed as implementing the goal in the proposal, clearly in line with the goals of the proposals here. It would be good, if only it were real. But it is not likely to be real, as the money is still owned by banks and investors. Poor sport the politicians might say. But the banks and funds can still move their money to other currencies to subvert the economy and have political leverage over government, and they can still withhold investment in areas where it is needed but would only return a loss. All they're doing is accepting a potential temporary setback in profitability. As soon as the political will is drained of initiative, the controls over banks and funds relaxes until it is just another friendly suggestion suddenly out of fashion. A trick that pretends to implement the system for a few seconds, only it doesn't, and then it returns, exclaiming the new system did not even work, `look, it was tried !' It is only tried if it is tried fully: finance under government and private moneys destroyed, democratizing businesses and distribution of resources. Then run that for a couple of centuries. Then see what has happened. That is a real test. You don't test a society on the fly inside another one, while only implementing maybe 3% of its provisions, under direction of people with interests hostile to it.
2. When there is no King, who is there to keep the system out of chaos ? In Capitalism and more so in Monarchy, the extremely wealthy have an interest in keeping the system going, even though they don't contribute to the system under the terms of the system. But what if everyone is inside the system, if everyone has a stake in overall wellbeing, but nobody hovers above the masses for its own self interest while being able to mend flaws to its own profitability ? The mending of flaws that would take the form of providing a structure. In the system proposed, we are all in the boat, and everyone has a part of the wheel. Except perhaps the King Elect (see Constitution under Electoral Committee), to whom this interest of hovering will fall in case it is needed.
Post revolution disintegration
It is possible that the Constitution proposed is too complicated to be sustained, so that the system of state disintegrates. It can also disintegrate for lack of popular interest in it, or it can be a system that it too overbearing for a simple rural setting. In such cases a simplified system might suffice, containing the essentials of resource distribution, no private capital investment gambling, a democratic government, and where possible turning the larger companies (if any) into democracies when starter leaves. Simple resource distribution: everyone gets the same size and value resources (land); the resource of the elders goes to the children, every 30 years the resource boundaries are adjusted to make room for more people, or to make the patches bigger when there are fewer people. Simple anti-capitalist rules: the government could create a pool of money, from which to lend to people that need consumption credit. The people who need the money pay it back, the government decides if the money is necessary for the stated goal. People who lend try to give security for the sum, unless the Government waves that. This would prevent some private money gambling, since there is an alternative. The money (or valuables) pool also acts as an insurance company for the community. The money is best stored in different portions, so that not all is lost at the same time to a thieve. Government officials can be personally accountable for their part. There exist many ways to have a more or less democratic government. One can appoint the eldest person in the area, city or village. One can determine a certain age, for instance 55, and have all people who have a birthday in that year be the government. One can elect for every so many people one representative. One can elect one person directly from between everyone, for life or for a number of years. One can appoint a government per lottery. One could combine schemes. One can also make skill demands, such as the Chinese did, so that only people who possess certain skills such as writing can be in the government. Then one can make demands on the government to perform certain acts and duties, so that the government does not become despotic, such as the Jews did who had their Kings copy large religious texts. Such simple systems could be enough in some rural settings, and they can be a back-up system in more complicated areas in case of disintegration. A way to boot up the system.